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I. STATUTES AND RULES OF IMPORTANCE To THE APPEAL
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND.

IV: [Search and Seizure.]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. XIV, CL.

1: [Citizenship Rights.]

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
I, § 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden Issuance of warrant]
UTAH CONST, ART.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses; papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
UTAH CONST, ART.

I, § 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
UTAH R. Civ. P.

1(a):

General provisions, (a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the
procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and
proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity,
and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other
rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and
except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to
i

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.
UTAH R. Civ. P. 8(a):

General rules of pleadings, (a) Claims for relief. A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types
may be demanded.
UTAH R. Civ. P.

8(c):

Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When
a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
UTAH R. CIV. P.

8(e):

Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency, (e)(1) Each
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(f):

Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice.
R. CIV. P. 12(c):
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for
judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
UTAH

ii

pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Hi

II. JURISDICTION

The district court's February 5, 2009, Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment, resolved all remaining claims in the action, thereby constituting a final
judgment within the meaning of UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). The notice of appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court was filed on February 18, 2009, within 30 days after the
date of entry of the final judgment, as required by

UTAH

R. APP. P. 4(a).

The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78A-3-102Q). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal

for decision to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78A-3-

102(4). The Utah Court of Appeals therefore had appellate jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78A-4-103(2)0). The Utah Court of

Appeals filed its final decision on Thursday, June 24, 2010 in Moss v. Parr,
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 2010 UT App 170 , 237 P.3d 899, a genuine
copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 1 [hereinafter Moss],
A Petition for Certiorari was timely filed in this Court on Monday, July 23,
2010, within thirty days of that final decision, as required by

UTAH

R. APP. P.

48(a). This Court granted such Petition for Certiorari by its Order filed on
November 23, 2010 [hereinafter Cert. Order]. This Court therefore has
jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78A-3-102(3)(a).

1

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Cert. Order granted certiorari on the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT?

Standard of appellate review:
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
CIV.

P.

12(C),

UTAH

R.

as to Counts II through VII of the First Amended Complaint

[hereinafter FAC], The standard for reviewing the district court's action on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is correctness. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39,
at fi 7, 191 P.3d 4, 6 ("We review the district court's denial of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings for correctness, granting no deference to the district
court's ruling.")
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on
the pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v.

Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)("The grant of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the
grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as
a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And in
considering the factual allegations in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts]
as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in

2

a light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Emphasis added,]")
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

An armed and uniformed police officer, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff
Heinz Kopp [hereinafter the Police] hired by private litigants who had obtained a
court order, and accompanied by one of the lawyers who hired him, Justin P.
Matkin [hereinafter Matkin] the lawyer's client representative, Mary Crowther
[hereinafter Crowther] and a hired computer technician, threatened to kick down
the door to the home [hereinafter Home] of petitioners, plaintiffs and appellants
[sometimes collectively hereinafter Plaintiffs], Susan I. Moss [hereinafter Moss]
and Jamal S. Yanaki [hereinafter Yanaki], if Moss did not allow the Police, Matkin,
Crowther and computer technician to conduct a warrantless search of the Home
and a warrantless seizure of property therein.
This unconstitutional search of the Home and seizure of property caused
injury to Moss and Yanaki, inter alia, in the loss of their constitutionally-protected
right of privacy, the unconstitutional deprivation of their property, trespass upon
their land and chattels and extreme emotional distress from the outrageous
nature of the violation. In addition, the wrongful use of the orders that were
obtained, for ulterior purposes not proper in the conduct of proceedings, also
caused injury. Moss and Yanaki seek redress for those injuries by asserting
against respondents, defendants and appellees [hereinafter sometimes
3

collectively Defendants] common law tort claims for abuse of process, trespass to
land and chattels, conversion, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and civil conspiracy.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings in a
Ruling on Motion, dated March 20, 2007 and entered on March 28, 2007. R.
465-468, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 2. The district court
held that the claims of Moss and Yanaki must be dismissed because Defendants
(although lacking a search warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement)
had obtained a private search warrant in civil litigation and so the warrantless
search was "reasonable." R. 467. The district court further held that the
Defendants could not be held liable for doing "only . . . what the order authorized
him to do." R. 467. The district court also held that defendants were privileged to
conduct the warrantless search and seizure by (1) their right to petition
government, R. 467-68; and (2) the judicial proceedings privilege. R. 467-68.
Finally, the district court held that Yanaki should have objected post facto to the
already-executed private search warrant order and that the failure of Moss and
Yanaki to appeal the issuance of the private search warrant (even though Moss
was not a party to the action in which it was issued) prevented them both from
pursuing their claims. R. 467. An order on the Ruling on Motion was entered on
May 10, 2007, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 3. R. 476-77.
4

The Court of Appeals affirmed by holding that "Plaintiffs cannot now
collaterally attack the legality of the [ex parte private search warrants,]" Moss,
2010 UT App. 170, T[ 12, 237 P.3d 899, 902, and "the [ex parte private search
warrants] are presumed valid and we affirm the district court's ruling dismissing
Plaintiffs' tort claims." /of., fl 14, 903.
C.

Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case

This case is about common law torts committed in the course of a
warrantless search and seizure. Defendants are lawyers who participated in a
conspiracy with their client, lomed, Jnc, [hereinafter lomed], to enter the Home of
Moss and lomed's former employee, Yanaki, without consent, ostensibly for the
purpose of conducting discovery and preserving evidence, but in fact for the
ulterior motive of sending a message to other lomed employees that if they did
not sign new employment contracts, they would be subjected to the same
mistreatment.
1.

The Police, together with Matkin, illegally entered the Home without

a warrant and conducted a search of the Home and seizure of property, in
violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of
America. The warrantless search and seizure constituted an actionable invasion
of privacy, conversion, trespass to land and chattels and extreme and outrageous
conduct First Amended Complaint [hereinafter FAC], fl 3, R. 130 (emphasis
added).
5

2.

Yanaki's former employer lomed conspired with the Defendants to

cause the misuse of a legal process and the warrantless search and seizure by
the Police, pursuant to which the Police and the co-conspirators, some of whom
are the named in the complaint, committed the alleged torts. FAC, fi4, R. 130.
3.

On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court,

Salt Lake County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, Inc. v. Jamal Yanaki,
Activatek, LLC, Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does /-X. The
complaint was assigned case number 020903031 and was assigned to the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District Court Judge. Co-conspirator Robert L.
Lollini, who was then the Chief Operating Officer of lomed, gave the instructions
to Defendants to cause the complaint to be filed. FAC, If 5, R. 130.
4.

The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers,

defendants Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. [hereinafter Law
Firm], Waddoups, Hafen and Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, obtained
upon ex parte application, a private search warrant in that civil case, purporting to
authorize a search of the Home and seizure of property from therein. Defendants
knew that the ex parte private search warrant was not a warrant under either the
warrant clauses of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States
of America. FAC, ^ 6 , R. 130-31.
5.

Although the co-conspirators purported to obtain the ex parte private

search warrant for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and
6

conduct discovery, they in fact sought it for illegal purposes and with ulterior
motivations. Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months
before the ex parte private search warrant was issued. Co-conspirator lomed
was, during the material time period, seeking to get its remaining employees to
sign new forms of non compete agreements, lomed desired to misuse legal
process to cause a warrantless search of the Home and seizure of YanakFs
property as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off
signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided.
The ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the warrantless
search and seizure at the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point
on the dangers to lomed employees of leaving lomed rather than signing the new
form of agreements. FAC, U1J7-8, R. 131.
6.

Defendants knew the warrant statute in effect (since repealed), said:

"Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the peace officer or
the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim
the contents of the warrant." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204 (2)(a) (2003)
(emphasis added) and they did not fit into either such class. FAC, If 10, R. 132,
Defendants also knew that private search warrants had long ago been held not to
satisfy the warrant requirement, as unconstitutional. Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah
36,49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941) ("Search warrants were never recognized by
the common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the
7

course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but
their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for
the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals.")(quoting
People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)). FAC, fl 11, R. 132
(and see other cases cited therein). Nevertheless, Defendants agreed to help
their client, lomed, to conduct a warrantless search and seizure together with the
Police. FAC, 1| 9, R. 131.
7.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15, 2002,

Matkin and the Police rang the doorbell of the Home three separate times,
awakening Moss. The Police agreed to join the conspiracy when they conducted
the warrantless search and seizure and agreed to be paid by the conspirators for
doing so. FAC, U14, R. 133. Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado. FAC, U
15, R. 133.
8.

Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the

front door and saw a Police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with
another man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the
Police presence, Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a
summons, complaint and copy of the legal process in the form of the ex parte
private search warrant. FAC, U 16, R. 133.
9.

After reading portions of the ex parte private search warrant and

seeing that is was directed to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki
8

was not Home and she would not allow thern in her Home without Yanaki being
present. FAC, If 17, R. 134. Matkin then said "we can come in now, or we can
come in later." Kopp, to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said:
"We can kick in this door," and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a
further legal process, impliedly allowing thern to do so. FAC, U18, R. 134. While
the Police surveilled the Home, on information and belief, Matkin procured a
second ex parte private search warrant, expressly directing the Police "to enter
the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 North Wall
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if necessary
and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute [the private search warrant]
including entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises,
and detaining any person who resists enforcement of the [ex parte private search
warrant]." FAC, ffll 19-22, R. 132.
10.

Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the second ex parte private

search warrant and Matkin, the Police and two other co-conspirators, all, in a
deliberate show of force, entered the Home under the threat of kicking in the door
and "detaining" Moss if she interfered with the warrantless search and seizure.
FAC, 1| 27, R. 136.
11.

The object of the conspiracy was to misuse the legal processes

obtained so as to conduct the an illegal search and seizure in furtherance of
Iorned's ulterior motive. That object was successfully carried out on April 15,
9

2002, when the Police, Matkin and other co-conspirators committed the
warrantless search and seizure. FAC, If 32, R. 137. Each of the co-conspirators,
including without limitation the Defendants and the Police, agreed to commit, and
did commit, one or more acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to allow
the conspiracy to obtain its object successfully. FAC, If 33, R. 137.
12.

On April 14, 2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against

Defendants and certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah. Defendants argued in support of a motion to
dismiss in that action that the search was reasonable. The federal district judge
held that "ftjhe invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only by an ex parte
submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit," was an "unreasonable
intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth Amendment is designed to
prevent." Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261,1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004),
afTd, 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), cert, denied sub nom. Yanaki v. Parr,
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1910, 164 L. Ed.
2d 663 (2006). The Defendants in this action did not appeal that holding. FAC, If
34, R. 137.
V. SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT

The Common Law of England for a quarter of a millennium has recognized
tort claims as the proper means to redress violations of fundamental rights. That
Common Law was adopted as the law of the State of Utah upon statehood. A
10

warrantless search and seizure, which was the object of the pleaded civil
conspiracy, is an outrageous violation of the privacy rights afforded the citizens of
the state of Utah by the warrant requirements of Article 1, section XIV of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The violation of the warrant requirements in this case was per se
unreasonable. Therefore, Plaintiffs have entitlement to redress for their injuries
under the common law. Once the warrantless search and seizure had occurred,
Plaintiffs' injuries were complete and they were entitled to assert their common
law claims.
The ex parte private search warrants on which Defendants rely do not meet
the constitutional warrant requirements. Therefore, they afford no justification for
Defendants' torts regardless of whether their legality was challenged following the
completed warrantless search and seizure. In addition, the case in which the
private search warrant was issued was dismissed upon a settlement and in which
neither Moss nor any Defendants were parties. Any possible appeal issue in that
case that was moot because the injury was a fait accompli.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals created a new element of the tort of
abuse of process, namely, that the process used must be illegal. That element is
contrary to this Court's statements of the essential elements of abuse of process
and must be reversed. Although the Court of Appeals did not express any view
12

on the remaining bases for the district court's dismissal, none of those provide
valid alternative grounds for the Court of Appeals to affirm.
The district court's reliance on judicial privilege failed to address the nature
of the privilege as applying to defamatory statements, not warrantless searches
and seizures. The district court's reliance on a first amendment privilege was
incorrect. Moreover, the district court's Ruling on Motion inappropriately made
merits-based decisions as a predicate for granting dismissal when the motion
before it was a pleadings motion.
Citizens of this state who are subjected to and injured by warrantless, nonconsensual, searches and seizures in private civil litigation must be afforded a
civil remedy under the common law to redress their injuries, The FAC adequately
pleaded the elements of and facts supporting common law causes of action to
obtain such redress. The district court and the Court of Appeals were bound to
accept as true the pleaded facts in the FAC, a genuine copy of which is attached
hereto as Appendix 4 and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs.
VI. ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied if any set of facts
could be proved in support of plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v.
Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 965 (Utah 1988)("A motion to dismiss is only
appropriate where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled
13

to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim.");
Pett v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 2004 UT App. 150, If 7, 91 P.3d 854, 856.
Such circumstances, where no set of facts could be proven in support of a
claim, exist in very narrow circumstances, such as where the claim cannot exist
as a matter of law, due to preemption, see, e.g., Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1059, (Utah 1991) (negligence claim properly dismissed as
preempted by Workers' Compensation Statutes), or the absence of statutory
support for a claim premised on a statute, see Pett, 2004 UT App. 150, at ffif 910,12,91 P.3d at 856-57.
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on
the pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v.

Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)(The grant of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the
grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as
a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And in
considering the factual allegations in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts]
as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Emphasis added.]") Under that
standard, as shown below, Plaintiffs clearly have stated a claim for relief.
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II.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COMMON LAW TORT REDRESS FOR THEIR
INJURIES CAUSED BY VIOLATIONS OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

In Kramer v. Pixton, 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 (1928), this Court stated that
"[i]t is axiomatic in the law that for every wrong there is a remedy." Id., 72 Utah at
9, 268 P. at 1032. The Common Law has recognized a right of action for
violations of fundamental rights for a quarter of a millennium. See Widgeon v.
Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1984):
One of the earliest cases to illustrate this point was Wilkes v. Wood,
Lofft's 1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763). In Wilkes, supra, the plaintiff
recovered damages in a trespass action brought against an official in
the office of the Secretary of State who entered his home and
seized his papers upon an unlawful general warrant Lord Pratt,
in his instructions to the jury, acknowledged that the official had
acted "contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution,1' id.
at 19, [footnote omitted] and stated that the jury could consider the
illegal conduct in assessing damages.
Id., 300 Md. at 526, 479 A.2d at 924 (emphasis added). This Common Law
precedent was binding on the Court of Appeals because the state of Utah
declared the English Common Law to be binding in its Courts upon statehood.
See American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40 If 50 & n.17, 557 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, at 10, 13 n.17 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, or
the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts
of this state." [quoting

UTAH REV. STAT.

§ 2488 (1898)].

The FAC in this action pleads injury to Moss and Yanaki based on a
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violation of their fundamental rights in the form of a warrantless search of their
Home and seizure of their property in furtherance of a civil conspiracy. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that persons' homes are the
subject of especially high expectations of privacy and concomitant protection
expressly provided by the Fourth Amendment:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety
of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home- a zone that finds its roots in clear and
specific constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in
their... houses . . . shall not be violated." That language
unequivocally establishes the proposition that "[at] the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion." [Citation omitted.] In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L Ed.
2d 639, 653 (1980)(emphasis added).
As the ultimate guardian of the fundamental rights of this state's citizens,
this Court has guaranteed that it is "committed unreservedly to the protection of
the right of privacy by guarding against any unwarranted intrusions upon the
peace and dignity of persons in their homes, hotel rooms or wherever they are
lawfully entitled to be in private." State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah
1977). This right derives from the protections of Section 14, Article I of the
Constitution of Utah and of Amd't IV of the Constitution of the United States which
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in identical language provide that The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses —

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be

violated . . . . ' " Id. n.2.
The fundamental right of privacy in the Home is so jealously guarded in
this state that this Court has "held that article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,
% 16, 164 P.3d 397,404 (emphasis added). "A warrantless search is perse
unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few '"specifically
established and well delineated exceptions.'"" State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, & 26,
227 P.3d 1251,1257 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.
Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), in turn quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L Ed. 2d 576 (1967)).
A co-conspirator deputy sheriff threatened to "kick in this door" when Moss
answered the doorbell in her pajamas and initially refused to allow entry into her
Home. FAC, fflf 14-18, R. 133-34. No established exception and well delineated
exception to the constitutional warrant requirements exists to allow entry into a
private litigant's Home or that allows private counsel to hire the Police in civil
litigation to conduct warrantless searches and seizures.
One would be hard pressed to imagine a more outrageous violation of the
fundamental right to privacy than to have a civil lawyer, with a hired uniformed
17

sheriff with a gun in tow, threatening to kick in one's door and to arrest the
resident if they get in the way of a warrantless search. If no meaningful redress is
available to address a violation of the fundamental right of privacy then every civil
litigant is a potential target of such extreme conduct
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Moss appends preconditions to the ability
to even plead for such relief that are not found in the essential elements of the
common law tort claims. The imposition of additional required elements, such as
establishing illegality of an order or that an order was appealed ignores the
absence of the required warrant and essentially provides the imprimatur of the
judiciary to the privacy violation suffered by Moss and Yanaki. This Court must
remove any hint of such an imprimatur by rejecting the preconditions of the Court
of Appeals. The rulings of the Court of Appeals and district court offend against
the remedies that were available in England under the common law. Those
remedies must be available today to vindicate the legitimacy and vitality of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens expressly by the Utah and United
States Constitutions. The Court of Appeals' failure to recognize the existence of
common law redress for a violation of fundamental rights and its affirmance of
judgment on the pleadings was therefore erroneous and should be reversed with
direction that the action should proceed in the district court.
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III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT Focus ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL WARRANT
REQUIREMENT, INSTEAD ERRONEOUSLY FOCUSING ON ORDERS THAT DO NOT
MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS.

The Court of Appeals wrote that "[because] each of Plaintiffs' tort claims
depends upon a determination that the discovery orders were illegal, Plaintiffs'
claims cannot survive without a determination that the discovery orders were
illegal." Moss, at fi 9 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals also wrote that
"Plaintiffs cannot fault Defendants for acting in compliance with the court
orders." Id. at If 8 (emphasis added).
These statements miss the point of Plaintiffs' protections under the Utah
and United States Constitutions and Plaintiffs' concomitant common law right to
seek redress for their injuries caused by the violation of their fundamental rights.
A lawful search and seizure may be conducted only pursuant to a warrant or a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. "A warrantless search is per se
unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few '"specifically
established and well delineated exceptions."'" State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, & 26,
227 P.3d 1251,1257.1
Process that does not meet the constitutional requirement of a warrant is
simply not a warrant This is true regardless of whether the process is in other

defendants' answer did not even allege that the search and seizure were
so conducted, see R. 149-56, passim, and the FAC expressly pleaded that the
search and seizure were conducted without a warrant and not subject to any
recognized exception, FAC fl 3, R. 130.
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respects legal or illegal. When their Home was invaded and their property taken
in the absence of a warrant, it is the absence of the warrant that is the violation of
the fundamental rights. The entire judiciary of this state must be bound by this
Court's commitment "unreservedly to the protection of the right of privacy[,]"
Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127. No order of a district court that is not a warrant can
overcome the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
This failure by the Court of Appeals to focus on the pleaded facts which
should afford a remedy to Plaintiffs is in contravention of Rules 8(a), (e)-(f).
Those rules require a Court reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings to interpret
the pleadings so as to afford justice, i.e. a remedy, if any sustainable claim can
fairly be gleaned from the pleading. See Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157,
159, 280 P.2d 453, 454 (1955).
The fundamental basis underlying all of the claims in the FAC is not the
illegality of an order, but the illegality of the pleaded warrantless search and
seizure that violated Moss and Yanaki's fundamental right of privacy, An ex parte
private search warrant is not the equivalent of a warrant which meets the
constitutional requirements for a reasonable search, as this Court held seventy
years ago in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941). In
fact, in Allen, this Court expressly outlawed private search warrants. Id. (holding
unconstitutional under

UTAH CONST, ART.

the Trade-Marks and Trade Names Act,

I, §§ 14, 24, ART. VI, § 26, that portion of
REV. STAT. UTAH
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§ 95-2-10 (1933) that

authorized searches for, and seizures of, knockoff products.)
This Court carefully analyzed the interests of the state in such an action as
follows:
Moreover, it has generally been recognized that the legitimate use
of the search warrant is restricted to public prosecutions, and
that in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the
protection of any mere private right It is a police weapon, and its
use constitutes a valid exercise of the police power.
Allen, 110 P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). This Court quoted with approval a
decision from the New York Court of Appeals:
Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as
processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of
civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private right;
but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted
and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and
punishment of criminals....
AH searches, therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions
of another, in order to secure a personal advantage, and not with any
design to afford aid in the administration of justice in reference to
acts or offenses in violation of penal laws, must be held to be
unreasonable, and consequently under our Constitution
unwarrantable, illegal, and void.
Allen, 110 P.2d at 361 (quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794,

797(1913)).
Further, specifically discussing the interests served by the Trade-Marks
and Trade Names Act, this Court stated: 'The primary, if not the only purpose of
such act,... appears to be the protection and enhancement of the good-will
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connected with the business of the owner of the mark." 110 P.2d at 361. The Act
had no connection to criminal prosecutions and the Utah Supreme Court found
that the Act bore "no actual relationship to the objects sought by the Act in a
proper exercise of the police power" and found that the search and seizure
provisions were unreasonable under

UTAH CONST, ART.

I, § 14. Id. In addition,

because the Legislature had granted "a special privilege to a special group or
class of persons, i.e., to those who are owners of trademarks or trade names" this
Court found that the Act violated the constitutional guarantee against the granting
of special privileges and for uniform operation of the laws, found in

UTAH CONST.

ART. VI, § 26, See Alien, 110 P.2d at 362.
This Court agreed with a decision from the Illinois Supreme Court
concerning a similar statute in Illinois, where it concluded: "The Act is wholly for
the benefit for the owners of personal property of this class, and is designed to
give to the owners of personal property of this class rights and privileges not
possessed by the owners of other classes of other property." Allen, 100 Utah at
53, 110 P.2d at 363 (quoting Lippman v. People, 175 III. 101, 51 N.E. 872 (1898).
Thus, this Court and the framers of the Utah Constitution have already
spoken and determined that there is no public or governmental interest that could
be served by a law allowing private owners of a particular class of property, here,
trade secrets, to use the government to conduct searches for their private
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interest.2
The foregoing law makes clear that no warrant existed that could meet the
requirements of the warrant clause in the Utah and United States Constitutions.
Whether some other order existed is immaterial to the violation of Moss and
Yanaki's fundamental privacy rights and is material solely to the use of such
orders to serve an ulterior motive not proper in the proceedings. The dismissal of
Plaintiffs' action on a pleadings motion is therefore unjustifiable under the
pleaded facts. The Court of Appeals' affirmance, having been based on the
existence of an order that was not a warrant, erroneously failed to address the
gravamen of the action. The Court of Appeals should therefore be reversed with
direction that the action should proceed in the district court.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENGRAFTING AN ELEMENT OF ILLEGALITY
OF PROCESS TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM.

Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim was dismissed because the Court of
Appeals held that the process had to be illegal to support a claim. Moss, fl 9, 237
P.3d 899, 901 ("Because each of Plaintiffs' tort claims depends upon a
determination that the discovery orders were illegal, Plaintiffs' claims [including
2

Where a law does not expressly authorize a search, the search's illegality
is even more palpable. Even a concern about destruction of records does not
justify a court order when the legislature has not deigned to allow such a remedy.
See Shankman v. Axelrod, 137 A.D.2d 255, 258-59, 528 N.Y. Supp. 2d 937, 938
(App. Div. 1988) (where statute does not allow expressly examination of records
or files, it must be assumed that the legislature intended a subpoena to be
adequate, "it is for the Legislature, not the courts, to fashion such an investigative
tool, if one is required.").
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abuse of process] cannot survive without a determination that the discovery
orders were illegal [emphasis added].") This requirement of illegality of process
is contrary to this Court's precedent. This Court has held that the essential
elements of abuse of process require a party to allege: "both [1] 'an ulterior
purpose' and [2] 'a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
conduct of the proceeding.'" Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, fl 36, 147 P.3d 383,
389 (citations omitted). There is no requirement that the process be illegal or
invalid in any way.
Plaintiffs alleged that the ulterior purpose of the defendants was not to
conduct any legitimate discovery, as ostensibly proposed, but rather to conduct a
raid on Yanaki's Home to instill fear in lomed's remaining employees. FAC.ffll 79, R. 131. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, as co-conspirators, wilfully used that
process in the course of the warrantless search and seizure, a process not proper
in the regular conduct of proceedings. FAC, fflf 14-20, 27-33, 42-46, R. 133-34,
136-37,139-40. Whether the process on its face was legal or illegal, it was
misused to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. The Court of Appeals'
requirement that Moss and Yanaki establish that the process was illegal in order
to adequately plead an abuse of process claim must be reversed and the case
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
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V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PRECONDITION THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRIVATE
SEARCH WARRANTS BE APPEALED FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS ALSO ERRONEOUS.

When it failed to focus on the warrantless search and seizure that
constitute the violation of fundamental rights, the Court of Appeals also
erroneously focused on the "failure" to appeal the issuance of the private search
warrants that do not in any event meet the constitutional warrant requirement.
See supra Part II.
Even if the orders actually issued by the district court were material to
Plaintiffs' claims, however (and with the exception of abuse of process they are
not), there could be no requirement that Moss and Yanaki appeal those private
search warrants. Moss, for example, was not a party to that action at any time.
No claims were asserted against her and she had no standing to appear in that
action. Moss was simply the private citizen who was present and who viewed the
warrantless invasion of her Home. It is worthy of emphasis in this respect that
the FAC pleads that Moss, "[a]fter reading portions of the Search Order and
seeing that is was directed to Yanaki... advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki
was not Home and she would not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being
present." FAC, If 17, R. 134. It was only after the Police threatened to kick in the
front door to her Home and to detain (i.e. arrest) her that she afforded entry to the
conspirators. FAC, ffi[ 18, 22, R. 134-35.
Further, the action in which the private search warrants were issued was
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dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement, R. 545, so any potential for
appeal was mooted. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, ^ 3,
48 P.3d 976, 977 ("Moreover, 'where the actions of the parties themselves cause
a settling of their differences, the case becomes moot,' and 'an appeal will be
dismissed as moot where the matter raised was settled by agreement, such as by
. . . voluntary dismissal of a claim.' [citing 5 A M . JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 654
(1995)]").
Moreover, no relief was available to Moss or Yanaki by objecting to the
district court or appealing to the appellate court regarding the issuance of the
private search warrants. That civil process had been completely executed and
the injury was a fait accompli the morning that the warrantless search and seizure
occurred. The injury caused by the violation of the fundamental right to Moss and
YanakPs privacy could not be undone by any further action of the district court or
the appellate court.
This Court has previously recognized the axiom that "[t]he law does not
require useless acts." Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 277, 233 P.2d 365, 373
(1951)(quoting Paxton v. Deardon, 94 Utah 149, 158, 76 P. 2d 561, 564 (1938).
Requiring an appeal, following a settlement, of the interlocutory issuance of ex
parte orders which had been fully executed by invading Moss and Yanaki's
privacy is not only useless, but such a requirement also has a chilling effect on
potential settlements. Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 536, 766 N.E.2d 482,
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491 (2002)("When a party settles, he loses both the opportunity and incentive to
appeal. When the losing party foregoes the right to challenge the ruling because
a settlement is in his best interest, it would be unfair to bar the party from
relitigating the determination in subsequent proceedings against different
parties.") The Defendants here were not parties to the lomed litigation, so the
Jarosz rule is apt.
As to the Court of Appeals' application of conclusive effect under the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS,

§ 11 cmt. a [hereinafter Restatement]

and associated Utah cases concerning collateral attacks on final judgments, that,
too, was error. The propriety of the issuance of the interlocutory, ex parte private
search warrants was never fully and fairly litigated. Yanaki was never heard on
the issue in the lomed case because both orders were obtained ex parte and
then fully executed before his return to Utah or the effectuation of service of
process upon him.
In those circumstances, it is not Restatement § 1 1 , cited by the Court of
Appeals, see Moss, % 9, 237 P.3d at 901, which governs, but rather Restatement
§13. Restatement § 13 says "final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of
an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect." Id. (emphasis added). A lack of adequate
deliberation (as necessarily occurs in an interlocutory, ex parte approach) would
prevent preclusive effect. "Before [applying preclusive effect], the court should
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determine that the decision to be carried over was adequately deliberated and
firm, even if not final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment already
entered." Id. cmt. g (emphasis added).
So not only does this Court's decision in Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co.
concerning mootness stand in the way of the Court of Appeals' ruling on the
conclusive nature of final judgments, the absence of a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, public policy and the correct section of the Restatement on
conclusiveness of final judgments do as well.
VI.

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS TORT CLAIMS
FOR RELIEF BASED ON THE CONDUCT OF THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

A.

The FAC Pleads a Claim for Abuse of Process.

"A claim for abuse of process requires the plaintiff to show (1) that the
defendant used legal process, (2) to accomplish an improper purpose or purpose
for which that process was not designed, (3) causing the plaintiff's harm."
Mountain West Surgical Center, LLC. v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2007 UT
92, atU 11, 173 P.3d 1276, 1278. The FAC plainly pleads each of these
elements.
For example, Plaintiffs allege "misuse [of] a legal process . . . by the
[Police], [Matkin] and certain unnamed co-conspirators." FAC, fl 3, R. 130.
Plaintiffs then allege that Defendants used yet another legal process relating to
their search and seizure, providing yet another basis for abuse of process. See
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FAC Tffl 27-28, R. 136. Plaintiffs allege an ulterior motive in the abusive use of
process: "lomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an illegal raid on the
Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off signing
new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided." FAC, H
8,R. 131.
FAC Count II, Abuse of Process, R. 139-140, incorporates all of the
foregoing and more predicate acts constituting the consummation of the
conspiratorial scheme to assist lomed in its ulterior motivation for misusing the
legal processes obtained and resulting in injury to plaintiffs. These include
threats to Moss to kick in the door of her house. FAC Tf 18, R. 134 and threats to
strip her of her liberty by "detaining" her, FAC ffl 22, 27-29, R. 135-136 all of
which was to establish a threat of intimidation to use against current lomed
employees.
Each of the plaintiffs was injured by this extraordinary abuse and use of
civil process, in the deprivation of their privacy, emotional well-being and physical
well-being caused by the acts of the conspirators. FAC fflj 46-47, R. 139-140. A
cognizable claim has thus been pleaded.
B.

The FAC Pleads a Claim for Invasion of Privacy.

In order to prevail on their invasion of privacy claim, plaintiffs "must prove
two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was 'an
intentional substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
29

seclusion of the complaining party,' and (2) that the intrusion 'would be highly
offensive to the reasonable person.'" Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944
P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Plaintiffs plead the awakening of Moss in
her Home, the threat to kick in the front door to her Home and the threat to detain
(i.e. arrest) her, followed by the non-consensual invasion and search of Moss and
Yanaki's Home, surveillance of the Home and seizure of both Moss and Yanaki's
property, FAC fflf 14-31, R. 133-137. These pleaded facts provide fair notice to
any reasonable person of an intentional, substantial intrusion upon the seclusion
of plaintiffs that is extremely outrageous. The elements of the claim are pleaded
in FACffif48-53, R. 140-141. A claim has been stated.
C.

The FAC Pleads a Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress.

In order to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
show: "(i) the [defendant's] conduct [complained of] was outrageous and
intolerable in that it offended . . . generally accepted standards of decency and
morality; (ii) [the defendant] intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of
the likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) [the plaintiff] suffered severe
emotional distress; and (iv) [the defendant's] conduct proximately caused [the]
emotional distress." Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins, Co.y 2002 UT 68, fl 37, 56
P,3d 524, 535. Again, all elements are met by the warrantless search and
seizure. The conspirators plainly intended to instill fear by their threat of violence
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in kicking in the door to the home, their threat to detain Moss, their surveillance of
the Home and through its ultimate invasion. The conspirators seized property
that did not belong to them and hauled it away. The ulterior motive was to instill
fear in lomed employees, so the intent to instill fear in Moss and Yanki is
reasonably inferable as well. There could be little more disturbing to any person
than the conduct exhibited by the conspirators in this case. Plaintiffs pleaded that
the conduct of the conspirators in fact caused them severe emotional distress,
even causing physical injury in Yanaki's case. FAC fflj 54-61, R. 141-142. A
claim has been stated.
D.

The FAC Pleads a Claim for Trespass to Land and Chattels.

The gist of an action of trespass is infringement on the right of
possession." John Price Associates, Inc. v. Utah State Conference, Bricklayers
Locals Nos. 1,2&6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980). The FAC pleads that
plaintiffs "were, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the Home
and its contents," FAC H 63, R. 142. The FAC further pleads that the "invasion of
the Home" and "the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as
well as Yanaki's confidential medical records, was a trespass to land and
chattels." FAC fl64, R. 142. Again, a claim has been stated.
E.

The FAC Pleads a Claim for Conversion.

Conversion requires "an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods
inconsistent with the owner's rights." Alfred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d
31
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726, 728 (Uiaii i ^ u ;

ne Co:nt for conversion incorporates all prior allegation

and specifically alleges: "Matkin, ii i "i i n therance of the conspiracy, converted
plaintiffs' chattels with at i ii itei it to deprive plaintiffs of their possession or use for
a period of time." I-AC, ffij 68, 70, R. 143 ^ [legations of dcmmion e^.d control
-nip met hy ll>' FAC's pk-*nriino offing warrantless seir .:. " \C r :> K. 142 and
intent is adequately pleaded in paragraph 70. See UTAH - C- . -* ^ bx '"Malice,
ii rtent, kno1* a ledge, ai id ::>tl iei coi iclitioi i of i i lir id

" ~" 3d

generally.")
F.

.

. . .

"I

"•jo prove civil conspiracy, five elements must; be shown: l (i) a combination
of two or more persons, "(2) an object to be accomplisl led, (3) a r i leeti-
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minds on the object or course of action,. (4) one or n lore unlawful, oven acts and
(5) damages as a proximate result tl iei eof, ' Alta Industries, Ltd, \ i* iurst, 846
" ' "•""

'-

t Jtah

1993)(quoting Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746
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co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein, committed the

torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below." FAC fl4, R. 130. Coconspirator lomed's ulterior motive is pleaded: "Yanaki had left lomed's
employment approximately three months before the Search Motion was filed.
Co-conspirator lomed was, during the material time period surrounding the filing
of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign new forms of
non-compete agreements. Co-conspirator lomed desired to misuse a legal
process to cause an illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its
employees that they would be better off signing new agreements than leaving
and risking their own homes being raided. The ulterior motive of misusing legal
process to conduct the warrantless search of the Home and seizure was thus
designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to lomed employees of
leaving lomed rather than signing the new form of agreements." FAC ^ 8, R. 1 3 1
A specific agreement between lomed and the Defendants to further the
conspiracy is pleaded: "Defendants agreed to help their client, lomed, place such
exclamation point by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and
seizure by the police, and by using the diversionary approach to the state judge
of ostensibly protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation,
rather than what they were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police
conduct an illegal raid." FAC If 9, R. 131. Culpable knowledge on the part of
defendants is pleaded: "However, as defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. §
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77-23-204(2)(a) [2003]3 expressly limits the class of applicants for a search
warrant to a 'peace office! 01 prosecuting attorney;11" I he defendants knew they
IN n?t fit int'" '-'i1har such ' i i ^ "" P^C 110, R, 132; see also FAC ffil 11-13, R.
132-133. In addition to Co-conspirator lomed's ulterior motivation, a specific,
•nspiracy w as described in FAC fl 3?, P \ 17 Fach of the
conspirators is pied to have undertaken one or more acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy, FAC"1) | / 8, R Il«!: I I, I h ila> < I i ill acts, il1 i tl le foi i i i • ::

• j n d w r l , imi

pleaded torts, see above, were pleaded to have been committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Plaintiffs pleaded that the conspiracy was the cause-in-tact and
legal cai jse of damages to then i. FAC % 79-80, R. 143-144. Again, a cognizable
claim was stated.
111

III

• •

I HE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMANCE OF I HE DISTRICT COURT WAS
ALSO ERRONEOUS BECAUSE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRORS.
A

The District Court Improperly Made Merits Rulings on a
Pleadings Motion,

The Court: of Appeals itself has warned against the general impropriety of
dismissing actions at the pleadings stage on affirmath re defenses, Foi e> lai i iple,

3

The statute that was in effect at that time, since repealed, read: The
gi ounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to Subsection
(2) shall be those required by this chapter, Prior to issuance of the warrant, the
magistrate shall require the peace officer or the prosecuting attorney who is
requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204(2)(a) (2003)(emphasis added). Therefore, the
statutory law was clear that only peace officers or prosecutors could request a
warrant.

the Court of Appeals has stated: "While Utah law recognizes a qualified privilege
of the sort Uintah raises as a defense to Zoumadakis's claim of defamation, see
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991), in the posture the trial
court dismissed her defamation claim, i.e., on a rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to
state a claim, the trial court jumped the gun in concluding the privilege was
dispositive." Id. The Court of Appeals continued its criticism of the tactic of
raising affirmative defenses in the context of a motion to dismiss:
In light of our analysis, it was not necessary for Zoumadakis to
amend her complaint to include allegations anticipating and rebutting
Uintah's claimed qualified privilege. In fact, the record shows that
Uintah has not even properly pleaded privilege as an affirmative
defense in answer to Zoumadakis's complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P.
8(c). Instead, Uintah raised the issue for the first time in support of
its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Raising an affirmative defense, like a
qualified privilege, for the first time in a 12(b)(6) motion is not
generally appropriate since "dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is 'justified
only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate
that the plaintiff does not have a claim."' Tucker v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, P7, 53 P.3d 947 (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). Thus, "affirmative defenses, which often raise
issues outside of the complaint, are not generally appropriately
raised in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)." Id. Consequently,
in the context of Uintah's 12(b)(6) motion, the burden of proving the
abuse of any qualified privilege was not yet on Zoumadakis. The trial
court should only have considered whether her complaint stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted based on the allegations of
the complaint itself, and not based on any possible affirmative
defenses.
/of. at 895 n.6. These criticisms of this practice are especially pertinent to the
district court's dismissal of the pleaded claims here based on affirmative
defenses.
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The district court made several rulings on the merits when the merits were
not before it. For example, the district court recognized that "the one offensive

Parr Waddoups." Ruling on Motion, at R. 465 -emphasis added), It is not the
pi ei ogative ol tl \e disti ict coi »i 1: t :> decide wh :

i I lUiul nialioi 11, offensir. n

The trier of fact must determine whether a warrantless search and seizure of
Plaintiffs' Home is offensive an 1 ::i I ic: \ \ offensive it is.
The district court also ruled, again on the merits, that the discovery 01 der •
was Intended to affect Moss minii 1 laily." Rulii lg 01 1 Motioi i, at R. 46 ; , Assuming
arguendo that such intent is material (and it is not) the district court does not have
the role of divining that intent. The statement also flies in the face of the pleaded

motivation that lorned wanted essentially a terroristic episode against \ anaki to
mist:1 in com incing its other employees to sicin now '.Tviployrnenl agreements.
' The district court made another merits ruling: T h e Parr Waddoups lawyer ••

•-:s:r.ct court, aga<^ •<• r

. "

:

*

'e -:r - oleadincs motion wra" ** -

lawyer did 01 did 1 not do. Sevei al excesses are cleai irrnn the pleaded facts
concerning conduct even the private search warrant did not pi irport to authorize,
such as; (1) a physical tl n eat to kid (in the door to tl le Home; (2) implying to Moss
that a warrantless search of her Home could be legitimately conducted; and (3)
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seizing property that belonged to Moss and Yanaki, rather than lomed.
The district court also made merits rulings on the reasonableness of
warrantless search and seizure, somehow finding in the pleadings a basis to rule
that "If Yanaki had indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he
would have ample opportunity to hide the material or destroy it. There is little
reason to suppose that a person who would steal such things would not hide
them or destroy them to avoid being finding out." Ruling on Motion, at R. 466.
This ruling assumed that Yanaki was guilty of stealing trade secrets in the
underlying action, again a merits-based decision. This ruling was reached even
though Yanaki's counsel pointed out that the President and Chief Executive
Officer of lomed had, in his deposition in the lomed case, confessed that the
"Confidential New Product" which Yanaki had been accused of stealing could not,
at the time of the President's deposition, be drawn by him or any other person at
lomed because it was just a "product concept" and not something that could even
be drawn. See Deposition of RobertJ. Lollini, 3/11/03, at 267:2-4, R. 608 (sealed)
at 50. Further, is such evidence had actually existed, Defendants could have
avoided the Home invasion and instead obtained it from the co-defendant
Ceramatec, Inc.'s business premises.
B.

Judicial Privilege Cannot, on the Pleadings (Or Otherwise),
Shield Defendants from Liability.

Defendants are not being sued for making any defamatory statements or
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for making any filings with a court. They are being sued for violating Plaintiffs'
fundamental rights of privacy and for misusing court processes for ulterior
motives foi v h r h !h,:iy ",pf^ npf Hesiqnpri i r

h i|nn

!,c "onspirator iomed to

send a message to its remaining employees to sign new employment contracts
rather than leave

• .

•

• .. •

In O'Connor v. Bumingham, 20CT UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214, ±'s
explici

*

~

- ;v'fed elenie
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the judicial proceedings privilege in this state:
The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the
alleged defamatory statement must have been made during oi ii
the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the statement must
have some reference to the proceeding's subject matter, Third, the
party claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity of
a judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the

time of the alleged defamation,
0'Conner, 2007 UT 58, U 31, 165 P.3d at 1222^23 (emphasis added), At the
soi e :i)f each c f

• .. .

-

-* \\

proceedings privicge .s tne requirement that l :r « - o e j . ^ a ^ a i c ' v s t a i e r e n f
M< in t™
i " w i n i\ ui ami ui ili»- i iijiiiiiii ii

MI si i ii III i lie: |iiuii i-ii |iiui eedinys pfMiiiHii- in n

;->e aoolied. No such defamatory statement is at the center of any claim- in this

Defendants had cited earlier cases on judicial proceedings privilege to the
district court if t their effoi t to i lave it i each a different coi icli ision. But those cases
a s W ei|

all involve statements which are defamatory in nature and so plaintiffs
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seek relief for the damage caused, directly or indirectly, to their reputations.
Defendants cited Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,
70 P.3d 17, for the proposition that u[t]he Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
rule in

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 682 cmt. b, that 'there is no action for

abuse of process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is
intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit
to the defendant'" That may be true, but Defendants missed the point that the
discovery process in civil litigation was never intended for the purpose of allowing
warrantless searches and seizures of homes.
Bennett more correctly stands for the proposition that "[a] plaintiff may state
a cause of action for abuse of process against a person "' who uses a legal
process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not
designed."'" Bennett, 2003 UT 9 fl 47, 70 P.3d at 28. Defendants purported to
use the civil discovery process, although it does not (and could not) authorize
warrantless searches and seizures. Defendants actually conspired to use their
orders for the purpose of justifying a warrantless search and seizure so that their
client could intimidate its remaining employees. That is actionable under
Bennett4
4

Defendants also cited below to Waiters v. Dinn, 633 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994). That case is likewise inapposite. The process at issue in that case
was a subpoena served to obtain records in discovery. See id. at 288-89. While
the subpoena was defective in its form, there is no comparison between the use
(continued...)
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Nevertheless, defendants' argued below: "Courts have repeatedly held
that the judicial proceedings privilege precludes claims like those presented here
based or
assistance ana c::ia!Pec

v * j . zyjr: j'ier6

De*encsn:s Ooen^a

I i lomorandurn, at 5 leiru
cited cases even involved a search and seizure.5 Defendants asserted that Foi TO
4

(. ..continued)
of a recognized and legitimate discovery tool and a warrantless search and
seizure.
5

The remaining cases cited by Defendants did not coi ne close to
mentioning the issue. Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the genera! propositions that
a privilege exists to make defamatory statements ii 1 litigation, that the privilege is
absolute, that it protects witnesses, lawyers, parties and judges from liability for
making defamatory statements or that the privilege lasts throughout the entire
litigation, which are propositions for which three Utah cases cited by Defendants
stand, namely, Riddle v, Perry, 2002 UT 10, 40 P.3d 1128; DeBry\ '. Godbe, 1999
UT 111, 992 P.2 979; Beezleyv. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 288 P.2d 1057 (1955).
Nor do Plaintiffs quarrel with the general proposition that the privilege bars all
claims for injury caused by the defamatory statement, whether sounding in
defamation, intentional interference or otherwise, for which the Utah case of Price
v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), cited by Defendants stands, The
warrantless entry into a home, search thereof and seizure of property is not,
however, a "publication" of "defamatory statements" with which the cited cases
were concerned. See Riddle, 2002 UT 10 at U 4, 40 P.3d at 1131 ("The
defamatory statement at issue in this case . " Emphasis added.); DeBry, • •
1999 UT 111 at If 4, 992 P.2d at 982 ("'Ms. DeBry's attorney, Clark Sessions,"
responded by letter to Judge Wilkinson the following day, stating that Godbe's
letter was an attempt "to demean, libel and defame Ms. DeBry.m" Emphasis
added.); Beezieyf 4 Utah 2d at 88, 286 P.2d at 1058 ("The publication of
defamatory matter by an attorney is protected . . ,." (stated in context of lawyer
being sued for publishing slanderous statement about opposing party to client));
and Price, 949 P.2d at 1253 ("Price filed a civil complaint based on these
comments in state court on June 18, 1996, against Armour and the Union,
(continued...)
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Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir.
1982), is "based on allegations that attorneys conducted improper discovery with
police assistance and obtained unlawful court orders." See Defendants' Opening
Memorandum, at 5, R. 258.
A careful reading of that case shows the assertion to be plainly wrong.
Forro Precision (1) did not involve the conduct of "improper discovery," (2) did not
involve "unlawful court orders" and (3) most certainly did not involve a warrantless
search of a private home by a private attorney and his hired Police. Forro
Precision in fact applied a privilege to make defamatory statements to the police
to initiate a criminal investigation, but only as to statements made to the police.
See id. at 1055.
The judicial proceedings privilege was addressed under California's
particular judicial privilege statute, which provides a far broader privilege than
Utah's defense of privilege. IBM went to the Santa Clara County police and
made statements to the California Attorney General to have them initiate a
criminal investigation. Id. at 1051. The Court quoted the California statute
concerning privileged statements: "'A privileged publication or broadcast is one
made-... 2. In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other
5

(...continued)
alleging libel, libel per se, and intentional interference with business relations."
[Emphasis added.]) A non-consensual warrantless search of Plaintiffs' Home is
simply not a statement, let alone a defamatory statement, to which the judicial
proceedings privilege applies.
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official proceeding authorized by law .. .."" Id. at 1055. The Court recognized
under the applicable third prong6 that "the privilege applies to communications
designed to j: i c n >pt officials to initiate proceedings as well as to communications
-. f r.:r^g the course of proceedings," The Court concluded under that statute
: .- : -'

i| , fs. rommunioalions to lm1" anlhoiifies ' were prn 'ileged," Id al 1056.

Therefore fre For" Precision case, read correctly, actually supports
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communications at all over which Defendants are being sued, In sum, Form
Precision does not stand for the proposition that Defendants have some privilege
to conduct a warrantless search of Plaintiffs* Home.
The other case supporting the assertion below by Defendants of the
"- *
i •;
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c,:L ra i>jr>er 6 2 - 5J9A.2d 1 ^ 7 ^ 9 3 8

6

It is apparent that the Court is discussing the thii d prong by its statement of tl i $
applicable policy: "Underlyii ig the privilege is the policy of encouraging freedom of
communication between citizens and public authorities charged with investigating
wrongdoing." Id
7

Defendants argued that ct[o]ther jurisdictions similarly apply the judicial
proceedings privilege to bar a wide range of tort ciaims[,] Opening Mem. at 4, R.
257, without specifying that such claims are, in each instance they cited,
premised on defamatory statements. Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. v. Griffith,
559 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. 1978), stands for the proposition, according to
(cor itii iued.. )
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Brown, the judicial proceedings privilege was applied to protect a hospital's

7

(...continued)
defendants, that no invasion of privacy action could be brought against them for
conducting an illegal search and seizure. In fact, the Lambdin Funeral Service
court expressed that the tort claims barred by the privilege were alleged to arise
from the publication of defamatory statements, not an invasion of privacy by
virtue of unlawful entry into a home. See id. at 792 ("In the instant case, each tort
charged in the complaint is predicated upon the publication by the defendant of
alleged acts of misconduct by the plaintiff."). In Middlesex Concrete Prods. &
Excav. Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 58 N.J. Super. 85, 172 A.2d 22 (1961),
following litigation, a testifying expert was sued for his statements made to his
client while he was merely a consulting expert concerning a dispute between his
client and Middlesex. The Court held that the communications with his client
concerning the dispute but before he knew he would be a testifying expert were
privileged, so could not form the basis of an intentional interference claim. In
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 (Cal.
1990)(en banc), the Court held only that a divorce attorney's statement "as to [a]
psychologist's neutrality and independence were privileged under [the Code]."
Id,, 50 Cal.3d at 219-20, 786 P.2d 374, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. This holding
was simply consistent with the Court's prior statement that the privilege
"immunizes] participants from liability for torts arising from communications made
during judicial proceedings . ..." Id., 50 Cal.3d at 214, 786 P.2d at 370, 266 Cal.
Rptr. at 643. Finally, the case of Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 53
Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966), did not purport to abolish the tort of abuse of process
because all process is obtained through judicial proceedings. To the contrary,
although California takes an extremely narrow view of the tort, the judicial
proceedings privilege has been declared not to apply to actions where the
gravamen of the action is the conduct of enforcement of an order or judgment,
rather than the communications to procure the order or judgment in the first
instance. See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065, 128 P.3d 713, 724, 39
Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 529 (2006)("Here, because the execution of the judgment did
not provide an independent basis for liability separate and apart from the filing of
the false declarations of service, the gravamen of the action was the procurement
of the judgment, not its enforcement. Thus, the enforcement of the judgment in
reliance on the filing of privileged declarations of service was itself privileged.")
Thus, even under a narrow interpretation never asserted in Utah of the abuse of
process tort, a claim over an illegal entry into plaintiffs' home, would survive.
What the Defendants communicated to the court in advance of their warrantless
search and seizure is not what Plaintiffs here complain about.
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lawyer from liability for filing a judicial petition on behalf of the hospital which
sought ai i 01 der allowing the hospital to ex tract the organs of a brain-dead man
wl1om

j t [iacj '[ 3een

u n a k| e i0

identify, for use in transplants. 539 A.2d at1373. A

claim by the decedent's relatives for malicious use of process had been
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any proposition as to whether the judicial proceedings privilege would appl\ to

against the lawyer for munianc^ : / a jorose, civil conspiracy, and assault and
battery, evei ith:*. r
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ned the decede
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In that limited contex4 ^>- r>= - - )jed that the judicial proceedings r
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protected the lawyei froi i i liability ' for filing a judicial petition, even thougt i there
was no defamatory statement, because preparation and filing of the petition is ail
the lawyer did, Id., 539 A.2d at 1374 ("[T]he well-pleaded averments indicate that
/ ftnrney Henri1?* only involvement in the case was his pi eparation of the petition
pursuant to his client's instructions, ai id that all the allegations against Heed are

i elied on Pennsylvania precedent, stating; "The inn i tunity bars actions for tortious

communication pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding, Thus, the
11

privilege barred claims for intentional interference with contractual or prospective
contractual relations, as well as defamation. 539 A.2d at 1374-75 (emphasis
added).
In contrast to Defendants' arguments below about the judicial proceedings
privilege barring any such claims, Courts have recognized the existence of
common law tort claims arising out of warrantless searches. In Walsh v. Erie
County Department of Job and Family Services, 240 F. Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ohio
2003), the plaintiff alleged that an illegal, warrantless search of a private home by
a state agency was extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to pursue a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 The Court, applying Ohio law that
appears substantially identical to Utah law, see id. at 766, denied a motion for
summary judgment, stating: "A reasonable juror, being apprized of the pertinent
Fourth Amendment legal doctrines, including the basic sanctity of the home and
the right to be free from unjustified intrusion, and, as well, the constitutional

defendants claimed below that Yanaki could not sue under this tort
because he was not present. This ignores the substantial emotional distress that
defendants knew they would cause from the fact of the search, itself, let alone
when Yanaki found out how his wife had been mistreated and threatened during
the process, in Hatch v Davis, 2006 UT44, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, the Utah
Supreme Court, although recognizing its preference for presence and setting the
bar high for a non-present plaintiff, rejected an absolute requirement that a
plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress be present to state a
claim. See id. 2006 UT 44 If 32, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28 ("Yet the door to
recovery remains open for the case where conduct is so egregious that the
plaintiffs circumstances cry out for relief."). Thus, all of the relevant facts must be
placed before the trier of fact, something a pleading motion does not do.
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protection otherwise given to the family, could view the threats of taking the
cl lildren away, the arrest, ensuing ei it! ) into the home, and the searches o1 " I V Ii "..
Walsh and the family home to have been outrageous " id. The pleaded fads in
this case clearly give rise to questions for the trier of fact to answer about whether
the conduct complained of in invadi*^ *~e home wmie Moss was home alone,
illegally., with threats of violence ar:i ~ ^iow of forc c for an illegal purpose,
constitute extreme and oi itragr-

3 ji; iclcmnent on 1he pleadings

--. defense of privilege was tnerefo:*e e r v - •
(

rhe First Amendu
Plaintiffs' Claims,

Lieleiulanla /• yaiiiiisJ

Defendants are not being sued because they petitioned their government

search and seizure, for their abuse of judicial process and for frightening Moss

9

indeedr this Court's own precedent suggests the ultimate viability of
Plaintiffs' claims despite the judicial proceedings privilege where something moi e
than the filing of pleadings and papers was involved. In Bennett, "'[according to
Bennett's own pleadings, the Jones Waldo defendants 1 bar order related conduct
was not "intentionally engaged in ... with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress,'" 2003 UT 9, % 69, 70 P.3d at 33, The Bennett Court did not exclude the
possibility that if more occurred than simply the filing of suit and use of process,
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could be stated. Anderson
Development Co, LC. v, Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 supports this
principle in its ruling: "As stated above, without more, neither the filing of a
lawsuit nor the improper use of the legal process is sufficient to support a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress," Id., ff 56, 116 P.3d at 339
(emphasis added), In this case, the threats to kick in the door to the Home and to
arrest Moss, under the circumstances alleged, are much more, as was
recognized by the Court in 1 Walsh.
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into opening the door to her Home, through which they passed without lawful
consent, invaded the Home of the Plaintiffs and stole Plaintiffs' property. The
district court held that Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955),
authorized this misconduct. Beezley, however, had nothing to do with the First
Amendment Instead, it simply recognized that the judicial privilege applies to
communications in demand letters preliminary to litigation. See Beezley, 286
P.2d at 1057-58.
Defendants actually cited the district trial court to Searle v. Johnson, 709
P.2d 328 (Utah 1985), as recognizing the limitations the First Amendment places
on state law tort claims. However, the facts of Searle are remarkably different.
There, plaintiffs, who owned a business in Uintah County, sued a group of
political activists who conducted a media campaign urging a tourist boycott of
Uintah County because they wanted to effect improvements in conditions at a
local dog pound. See id. at 328-29. Finding an insufficient governmental interest
in restricting the peaceful political activity of the defendants, the Court held that
the First Amendment protected politically-motivated speech of the defendants.
See id. at 330.
The warrantless search of Moss and Yanaki's Home does not involve
politically-motivated speech. This Court has in fact never extended First
Amendment immunity beyond politically-motivated petitions. In Anderson
Development Co., LC. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, a case also cited to
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the district court below by Defendants, recounted the development of the
privilege: "0 ^erthe years, com ts have exter ided ti lis in n i: in n fity do ::ti in le, i eferred
t 0 as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, see R A \ i ' City of Si Paul, 505 U.S. 377',
420, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 LEd.2cl 305 ( 1992), to 'pi otect
agains

political acti\ ity

^s as well as antitrust claims,' Searie v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682,

684 (Utah r. . ' ;* ?™r ' ,T " 45 at fl 26, 115 P 3d at 332.
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analysis of the abuse of process claim there focused on whether there were

were false, not on the merits of the underlying action. See id, at 915, Further, oi i
Scott's False Imprisonme
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element of illegality "efferiv^
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cognized ti at tl le tort's
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. too, here, does the

illegality of Defendants' conduct prevent any in£-^o--mer.: >n c: chilling of their
First Amendment rights, so there is no First Amendment privilege. Jt ,iKe effect
js

another case

Defendants cited to the district court, Protect Our Mountain

Environment, Inc \ '. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo, 1984)(en banc). I he
' Yiurf there state 1 "The right lo petition government, however, is not without
limits, The First Amendment does not grant a license to use the courts for
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improper purposes." Id. at 1366.10 Warrantless searches and seizures cannot be
characterized as proper, by their very illegal nature. There simply is no
infringement on or chilling of Defendants' First Amendment rights that results
from suing them here.
In short, no case has held that a First Amendment right exists to conduct a
warrantless search and seizure.
CONCLUSION

The warrantless search and seizure deprived Plaintiffs of their fundamental
right to privacy. The common law affords them redress in tort. Defendants
abused the process of the Court that they did obtain by obtaining it for an ulterior
purpose and using it in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings be

[THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

10

The Colorado court did adopt a singular procedure not recognized by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, of requiring that every pleading-based motion on
such a privilege claim be treated as a summary judgment motion and requiring
that evidentiary material be submitted to support a showing that the privilege
does not apply. See id. at 1368-69. The Utah courts have never mandated such
a departure from the requirements for a moving party to prevail under UTAH R.
CIV. P. 12(c).
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reversed, in its entirety, and that this case be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

"Tn day "JJa jar y 2011.

/"'"" ""PCTERS I SCOFiELu
A Professional Corporaf'c

L^A/V
—David W. Scofield
Attorneys for Susan I. Moss
and Jamal S. Yanaki
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OPINION
[**899] THORNE, Judge:
[*P1J Plaintiffs Susan I. Moss and
Jamal S. Yanaki (collectively, Plaintiffs)
appeal the district court's ruling granting
Defendants Parr Waddoups Brown Gee
& Loveless (Parr); Clark Waddoups;
Jonathan 0. Hafen; [**900] and Justin
P. Matkin's motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to counts two through seven
of the first amended complaint and
judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] On April 9, 2002, lomed, Inc.
filed a complaint against its former
employee, Yanaki, alleging that Yanaki
had misappropriated proprietary
information (lomed case). Iomed was
represented by Parr, which obtained two
ex parte discovery orders that directed
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office,
with the assistance of Iomed, to take
custody of certain electronically stored
data and other records maintained at
Plaintiffs' home office. The discovery
orders authorized [***2] Iomed to copy
the files and return the copies to Yanaki
and to file the originals with the district
court under seal. The discovery orders
also allowed Yanaki1 s counsel to review
the electronic files and make objections
before they would be made available to
Iomed's counsel.

[*P3] On April 15, 2002, Matkin,
an attorney with Parr, and a Salt Lake
County deputy sheriff went to Plaintiffs'
home. Moss answered the door. The
deputy handed Moss a summons, a
complaint, and a copy of the discovery
order authorizing the seizure of
documents relating to Iomed's claim of
misappropriation against Yanaki. Yanaki
was out of town at the time, and Moss
declined to allow Matkin and the deputy
into the home. Matkin told Moss he
intended to obtain a further court order
and left. The deputy remained at
Plaintiffs' home while Matkin obtained a
second order which authorized use of
reasonable force to enter the house and
seize the relevant records. Matkin then
returned with a supplemental order and
Moss allowed Matkin, the deputy, and
others into the home to execute the
discovery order. Subsequently, Yanald's
computer hard drive and additional
documents were deposited with the
district court. •
1 The parties settled [***3] the
Iomed case in 2005.
[*P4] In 2003, while the Iomed case
was pending, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against Parr and others in the United
States District Court for the District of
Utah alleging civil rights violations
arising from the seizure of evidence
pursuant to the district court's discovery
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orders. In 2004, the federal court
dismissed the case ruling that it did not
find a section 1983 violation, see 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), because the
actions of the private defendants did not
amount to state action as is required to
sustain a federal civil rights claim.
[*P5] In December 2005, Plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint in the
present suit against Defendants, alleging
claims for (1) breach of settlement
agreement, (2) abuse of process, (3)
invasion of privacy, (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (5)
trespass to land and chattels, (6)
conversion, and (7) civil conspiracy.
After filing an answer, Defendants filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to counts two through seven pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c).
The district court heard argument on
Defendants' motion. The district court
granted Defendants1 motion to dismiss
counts two through seven of the
amended [***4] complaint ruling that
Defendants were operating within the
framework of the doctrine of judicial
privilege and that Plaintiffs were
collaterally estopped from pursuing their
claims. Defendants then filed a motion
for summary judgment as to count one,
which the district court denied.
Following an interlocutory appeal, this
court reversed the denial of that partial
summary judgment and remanded the

case for entry of partial summary
judgment in favor of Defendants, see
Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &
Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, P 1, 197
P. 3d 659. On remand, the district court
entered partial summary judgment on
count one of the amended complaint.
Plaintiffs now appeal from the district
court's ruling dismissing counts two
through seven of the amended
complaint.
ISSUE
REVIEW

AND

STANDARD

OF

[*P6] Plaintiffs argue that the
district court erred by granting
Defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings. "When reviewing a grant of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings,
this court accepts the factual [**901]
allegations in the complaint as true; we
then consider such allegations and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Intermountain
Sports,
Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 2004 UT App
405, P 7, 103 P,3d 716 [***5] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
[*P7] Plaintiffs argue that the
district court's judicial privilege rulings,
and other merit-based rulings, used to
dismiss the tort claims raised in the
amended complaint were improper in the
face of Plaintiffs' allegations of
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Defendants' improper motive in
obtaining the two discovery orders and
then illegally searching Plaintiffs' home
and removing Plaintiffs' property.
Plaintiffs asserted in their amended
complaint that Defendants' search of the
home and seizure of property were
illegal acts performed in the course of
litigation in the prior Iomed case against
Yanaki, constituting actionable tort
claims for abuse of process, invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, trespass to land and
chattels, conversion, and civil
conspiracy.
[*P8] Plaintiffs' tort claims are each
based on the assertion that Defendants'
search of the home was illegal. The
search was conducted pursuant to two
presumably valid, court-issued discovery
orders entered in the Iomed case. See
generally 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules,
and Orders § 59 (2000) ("All court
orders are presumed valid and will stand
until corrected on review or set aside.").
As such, 1***6] Plaintiffs cannot fault
Defendants for acting in compliance
with the court orders. See generally In re
J.K, 960 P.2d 403, 410 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (holding that the juvenile court
erred as a matter of law when it faulted
the state for terminating reunification
services after the court had specifically
ordered that those services be
terminated); cf Carter v. Mitchell, 225

Ala. 287, 142 So. 514, 517 (Ala. 1932)
(finding that a receiver, acting as a
representative of the court, is protected
in carrying out instructions by virtue of a
valid, though erroneous, order, and that
the court order under which the receiver
acts is a complete defense to personal
liability in any action or proceeding);
White v. Camden County Sheriffs Dep%
106 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Mo. Ct. App.
2003) (stating that l?[c]onduct which is
intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the judicial process is protected
by absolute judicial immunity" and
finding that an officer is entitled to
official judicial immunity for actions
pursuant to a facially valid court order
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, "disobedience of any lawful
judgment, order or process of the court"
constitutes contempt. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) [***7] (2008).
[*P9] Because each of Plaintiffs'
t o r t claims depends upon a
determination that the discovery orders
were illegal, Plaintiffs' claims cannot
survive without a determination that the
discovery orders were illegal. Plaintiffs
did not, however, challenge the
discovery orders in the proceeding in
which the orders were issued. "With rare
exception, when a court with proper
jurisdiction enters a final judgment, . . .
that judgment can only be attacked on
direct appeal." State v. Hamilton, 2003
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UT 22, P 25, 70 P.3d 111. "The general legality of the discovery orders because
rule of law is that a judgment may not be he failed to use any of the available legal
drawn in question in a collateral avenues for challenging the orders at the
proceeding and an attack upon a time they were issued or executed in the
judgment is regarded as collateral if Iomed case. See generally Hamilton,
made when the judgment is offered as 2003 UT 22, PP 25, 31, 70 P.3d 111
the basis of a claim in a subsequent (applying the rationale disfavoring
proceeding.'" Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT collateral attacks to preclude a defendant
App 78, P 15, 132 P. 3d 63 (quoting from collaterally attacking the validity
Olsen v. Board o/Educ, 571 P.2d 1336, of a tax deed); Collins v. Sandy City Bd.
1338 (Utah 1977)); see also Olsen, 571 of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P 19, 52
P. 2d at 1338 (noting that a collateral P. 3d 1267 (holding that the plaintiffs
attack has been defined as follows: forfeited their right to attack a decision
"'Where a judgment is attacked in other on direct appeal because they could
ways than by proceedings in the original have, but elected not to, challenge the
action to have it vacated or revised or decision rendered in the [***9] previous
modified or by a proceeding in equity to case); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah
prevent its enforcement, the attack is a Dep't ofCorr., 942 P.2d 933, '946 (Utah
"Collateral Attack.""' [***8] (quoting 1997) (declining to consider a collateral
Restatement of Judgments § 11 cmt. a attack of the justice or equity of orders
(1942))).
for which no review was sought by the
[*P10] Any claimed error regarding defendants).
the discovery orders at issue in this case
could have been challenged or dealt with
in the proceeding in which they were
sought and obtained. Yanaki did not
challenge or object to the illegality of
the discovery orders in the Iomed case.
Plaintiffs' tort claims in the instant case
are all based on the invalidity of the two
discovery orders issued in that case. As
such, each claim represents a collateral
challenge to the discovery orders. Under
[**902] the circumstances, Yanaki
cannot now collaterally attack the

[*P11] Although Moss was not a
party to the Iomed case, she is similarly
precluded from collaterally attacking the
validity of the discovery orders. We
recognize that Moss, as a nonparty to the
Iomed case, would have had difficulty
challenging the discovery orders in the
previous case. See Brigham Young Univ.
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT
17, PP 27-47, 156 P.3d 782; see also
Ashton v. Learnframe, Inc., 2008 UT
App 172, PP 9-10, 185 P.3d 1135
(noting and agreeing with the trial court
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that "nonparties . . . cannot appeal the
supplemental order"). Nonetheless,
Moss, who claims to have been affected
by the search pursuant to the allegedly
illegal discovery orders, could have
attacked the validity of the orders by
filing a motion to intervene or a petition
for an extraordinary writ. See Ashton,
185 P. 3d 1135, 2008 UTApp 172, P 12
(determining that nonparties have two
options: (1) file a motion to intervene or
(2) file an extraordinary writ); Trernco,
2007 UT 17, P 46 n.7, 156 P3d 782
(same). Moss, [***10] like Yanaki,
failed tQ use any of the available legal
avenues for challenging the orders in the
Iomed case, and as such she cannot now
collaterally attack the legality of the
discovery orders,
[*P12] Because we determine that
Plaintiffs cannot now collaterally attack
the legality of the discovery orders, we
affirm the district court's ruling
dismissing Plaintiffs' tort claims. 2 Our
holding is dispositive of this appeal;
therefore, we do not reach any of
Plaintiffs' other issues.
2 The district court applied the res
judicata principal of collateral
estoppel and similarly determined
that Yanaki and Moss were
precluded from challenging the
discovery orders. The district court
ruled,

Plaintiff, Yanaki,
should have objected to
the supposed illegality
of the discovery order in
the initial Iomed case
wherein he was sued. He
never pressed an
objection to that order.
He settled the case so
there was no appeal. It
is, therefore, presumed
that the discovery order
was valid. Yanaki took
an active part in that
case. He raised thirtyone defenses
and
included three counts in
his counterclaim none of
which dealt with the
discovery order. He had
an o b l i g a t i o n
to
challenge the order if he
felt it was illegal
[***11] or
even
improperly
issued,
especially since Iomed's
case depended upon it.
The Plaintiffs are
collaterally estopped
from pursuing this
claim.

CONCLUSION
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[*P13] Plaintiffs in the instant case
assert that Defendants' search of their
home and seizure of property were
illegal acts, which constitute the
actionable tort claims raised in their
amended complaint. Defendants1 actions
were taken in compliance with two
discovery orders obtained in the Iomed
case. Each of Plaintiffs1 causes of action
depends upon a determination that the
discovery orders were illegal. Plaintiffs
did not challenge or object to the
illegality of the discovery orders in the
Iomed case.
[*P14] "The general rule of law is
that a judgment may not be drawn in
question in a collateral proceeding and
an attack upon a judgment is regarded as
collateral if made when the judgment is
offered as the basis of a claim in a
subsequent proceeding." Olsen v. Board
of Educ, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1977). Plaintiffs' attack on the discovery

orders issued in the Iomed case are being
used as the basis of their tort claims in
this case. As such, Plaintiffs' challenge
to the discovery orders is regarded as a
collateral attack. Because Plaintiffs
[***12] failed to use any of the available
legal avenues for properly challenging
the discovery orders in the Iomed case,
they are precluded from collaterally
attacking [**903] the validity of those
orders. As a result, the discovery orders
are presumed valid and we affirm the
district court's ruling dismissing
Plaintiffs' tort claims.
[*P15] Affirmed.
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
[*P16] WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
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SAL'
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTA^^LAKE|OUI^TY
Deputy Cierfc

SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S.
YANAKI,
Plaintiffs,
RULING ON MOTION
vs.

Civil No. 050913371
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE
& LOVELESS, a Utah professional
Corporation; et aL,
Defendants.

The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to counts 2 through 7 of the first
amended complaint. The Court heard the motions on February 15,2007, with Alan L. Sullivan
appearing for the Defendants and David W. Scofield appearing for the Plaintiffs. After hearing
oral arguments the Court took the motion under advisement. The Court having reviewed the
material provided now rules on the motion.
This is the third time some of these parties and some of these issues have been before the
courts. First, lomed, Inc. (" lomed") sued Jamal Yanaki ("Yanaki") and others on or about Apri]
12,2002. The parties settled that case without trial. Later, Yanaki sued lomed and others in the
federal disrict court alleging a Section 1983 civil rights violation. That case was dismissed. The
federal court did notfinda Section 1983 violation and declined to hear the state law claims. The
third court action is Susan I. Moss ("Moss") and Yanaki suing Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &

APPENDIX 2

UU6

Loveless, a Utah professional corporation ("Pair Waddoups") and others. Parr Waddoups is the
lawfirmthat represented lomed in thefirstaction.
This case centers around a discovery order issued by the court in thefirstaction. Parr
Waddoups received a discovery order allowing them to go into Yanaki's home and take
informationfromhis computer. The order was issued by a district court judge. The Petitioners
claim this was a search and seizure under the criminal law and not a valid discovery order under
the civil law.
If Plaintiffs' position is accepted, then there could be no real discovery in a civil action of
this nature. lomed would have to give advance notice of the material to be discovered. If Yanaki
had indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he would have ample opportunity
to hide the material or destroy it There is little reason to suppose that a person who would steal
such things would not hide or destroy them to avoid being found out.
In this case the Defendants did everything that they could reasonably have been expected
to do. Theyfileda lawsuit, moved for an order to conduct immediate discovery, supported the
motion by affidavits, received an order allowing immediate discovery issued by a district judge,
and, when a problem arose during the attemped search, even obtained a supplemental order in aid
of enforcement The discovery order and the execution of it were carefully limited. Those
executing the discovery order were escorted directly to the computer. Nothing else in the house
was searched. Only the computer information was taken. Copies were left for Yanaki. The
original was not given to lomed but to the court. It was to be used only as authorized by the
court. A law enforcement officer, assisted by others, executed the discovery order. The one
offensive aspect of the execution of the discovery order was the presence of a lawyer from Parr
Waddoups. This seems less offensive, however, when it is remembered that counsel is normally

present during discovery. The Parr Waddoups lawyer only did what the order authorized him to
do. The discovery order was reasonable and necessary to preserve evidence. There are very few
instances when this kind of discovery would be justified and this one of them. It does not offend
the Court's sense ofjustice to see it used in a case such as this.
The discovery order also affected Moss. She lived with Yanaki and was his fiancee. She was the person at home when the discovery order was executed. In the current action her counsel
refers to Moss and Yanaki as a married couple. Since the computer was in their home she.
became subject to the discovery order and is bound by the outcome of the lomed action. She was
not a party in the lomed case but she could have intervened in it. The discovery order was
intended to affect Moss minimally. It was directed to the contents of the computer which could
not be reached without entering their home.
The Plaintiff, YanaM, should have objected to the supposed illegality of the discovery
order in the initial lomed case wherein he was sued. He never pressed an objection to that order.
He settled the case so there was no appeal. It is, therefore, presumed that the discovery order Was
valid. Yanaki took an active part in that case. He raised thirty-one defenses and included three
counts in his counterclaim none of which dealt with the discovery order. He had an obligation to
challenge the order if he felt it was illegal or even improperly issued, especially since lomed's
case depended upon it. The Plaintiffs are collaterlly estopped from pursuing this claim.
Counts two through seven of the amended complaint are all interconnected. None can
stand independent of the discovery order. All are based on it.
This Court must also recognize the Defendants' right to petition government. The parties
to a lawsuit are subject to the doctrine ofjudicial privilege. The judicial proceedings privilege
"is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom

in their efiforts to secure justice for their clients." Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64,286 P.2d
1057 (1955). The Defendants were operating within the framework of this privilege.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss counts two through seven of the amended complaint
is granted. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to draw the formal order.
Dated this 20fh day of March, 2007.

•i^yfc*-*.-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S. YANAKI,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS
TO COUNTS H THROUGH VH OF THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE &
LOVELESS, a Utah professional
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS;
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P,
MATKTN; and JOHN DOES I through XX,

Case No. 050913371
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

i

On February 15,2007, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts II
through y n of the First Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the
Honorable Douglas L. Comaby, Senior Judge, presiding. David W. Scofield appeared on behalf
of plaintiffs, and Alan L. Sullivan appeared on behalf of defendants. At the close of oral
argument, the Court took the motion under advisement. On March 20, 2007, the Court issued its
Ruling on Motion, which granted the motion.
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Based upon the Court's previous Ruling on Motion, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted, and Counts II through VIT of the First Amended
Complaint, are hereby dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling on
Motion.
DATED this Jj_ day of April, 2007.

Approved as to foim:
• SCHOHELD PRICE

Scofieldt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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340 Broadway Centre
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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A Professional Corporation
340 Broadway Gentre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: {801)322-2002
Facsimile: (801)322-2003
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN I. Moss and JAMAL S, YANAKI,
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

i
Case No. 050913371

PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE &
LOVELESS, a Utah professional
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS;
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P. MATKIN;
and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH XX,

Defendants.

Honorable Leslie A Lewis
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
j

Plaintiffs, for their claims against defendants, allege as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Susan I, Moss ("Moss") is an individual residing in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, whose home is at 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Home").
2,

Plaintiff Jamal S. Yanaki ("Yanaki"), who resides at the Home, is a former

employee of lomedt Inc. flomed"), at which his last day of employment was January
17, 2002.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.

This case arises out of a successful conspiracy to misuse a legal process

and to cause an illegal search of the Home and seizure of property therein by the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Office (the "Police"), named defendant Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin")
and certain unnamed co-conspirators. The Police, together with Matkin, illegally
entered the Home and illegally conducted a search of the Home and seizure of property
without a valid search warrant, with no exception to the requirement of a valid search
warrant and in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States
of America (the "Illegal Search and Seizure"). The Illegal Search and Seizure, being
illegal, constituted an actionable invasion of privacy, conversion, trespass to land and
chattels and extreme and outrageous conduct,
4.

lomed conspired with the named defendants to cause the misuse of a

legal process and the Illegal Search and Seizure by the Police, pursuant to which the
Police and the co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein,
committed the torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below.
5.

On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake

County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, Activatek, L.L.C.,
Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does l-X. The complaint was assigned case
number 020903031 and was assigned to the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District
Court Judge. Co-conspirator Robert L. Lollini, who was then the Chief Operating Officer
of lomed, gave the instructions to defendants to cause the complaint to be filed.
6.

The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers, defendants

Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. ("Law Firm"), Clark Waddoups
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("Waddoups"), Jonathan 0, Hafen ("Hafen") and Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy,
caused to be filed an Ex Parte Motion for Order to Conduct Immediate Discovery to
Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence (the "Search Motion"), At the time they
caused such Search Motion to be filed, defendants knew that the relief they sought was
illegal under both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States of
America.
7.

Although the co-conspirators purported by the Search Motion to seek a

legal process for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and conduct
discovery, they in fact sought a legal process for illegal purposes and with ulterior
motivations.
8.

Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months before the

Search Motion was filed. Co-conspirator Iomed was, during the material time period
surrounding the filing of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign new
forms of non-compete agreements. Iomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an
illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better
off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. The
ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the Illegal Search and Seizure of
the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to Iomed
employees of leaving Iomed rather than signing the new form of agreements.
9.

Defendants agreed to help their client, iomed, place such exclamation point

by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure by the police, and
by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly protecting trade
secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they were realty
doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid.
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10.

However, as defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23~204(2)(a)

expressly limits the class of applicants for a search warrant to a "peace officer o r . . .
prosecuting attorney," The defendants knew they did not fit into either such class.
11.

In addition, defendants knew that private search warrants have long been

outlawed by the states. See, e g„ Womack v. State, 281 Ala. 499, 503, 205 So.2d 579,
582 (1967) ("Search warrants are criminal processes, issued under the police power of
the state, to aid in the detection or suppression of crime, and have no relation to civil
process ortriais.");L/pp/nan v. People, 175 III. 101, 111, 51 N.E. 872, 874-75 (1898) (The
premises of a citizen cannot be intruded upon under a search warrant, for any such
private purpose."); State v. Derry, 171 Ind. 18, 24, 85 N.E. 765, 768 (1908) ("Neither at
common law, nor under the statute, is such process [search warrants] available to
individuals in the course of civil proceedings, nor for the maintenance of any mere private
right. It may only be invoked in the furtherance of public prosecutions."); Robinson v.
Richardson, 79 Mass. 454, 456 (1859) ("Search warrants were never recognized by the
common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil
proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was confined
to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the
detection and punishment of criminals."); State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont.
191,197, 224 P. 862, 864 (1924) ("The power to make searches and seizures is
absolutely necessary to the public welfare. But the process may be invoked only in
furtherance of public prosecutions,"); Luciano v. Marshall, 95 Nev. 276, 278, 593 P.2d
751,752 (1979) ("[T]he legitimate use of the search warrant is restricted to public
prosecutions, and . . . in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of
any mere private right."); Alien v. Trueman} 100 Utah 36, 49,110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941)
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("Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as processes wnicn mignt
be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of
any mere private right; but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions,
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of
criminals." quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)).
12.

Defendants knew at the time they agreed to seek such legal process that it

would constitute a violation of, at the least, UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14,23-24, ART. VI, §
26, according to the holding of Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49,110 P.2d 355, 361
(1941), as well as U.S. CONST, AMEND. IV, V, XIV, to use such legal process to conduct a
search and seizure at a private home.
13.

The legal process obtained, the Search Order, was unlawful for any such

purpose.
14.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15, 2002, Matkin

and Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), rang the doorbell of the
Home three separate times, awakening Moss. Kopp and the Police agreed to join the
conspiracy, by misusing the legal process to commit the Illegal Search and Seizure,
and to be paid by the conspirators for doing so, no later than this time.
15.

Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado.

16.

Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the front

door and saw a police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with another
man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the Police presence,
Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a summons, complaint and
copy of the legal process in the form of the Search Order,
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17.

After reading portions of the Search Order and seeing that is was directed

to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki was not Home and she would
not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being present.
18.

Matkin then said "We can come in now, or we can come in later." Kopp,

to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: "We can kick in this door,"
and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a further legal process, impliedly
allowing them to do so,
19.

Matkin then left while Kopp remained, surveying the Home and thereby

intimidating Moss.
20.

On information and belief, Matkin then, in furtherance of Kopp's threat to

kick down the door to gain entrance to Moss and Yanaki's Home, made a second, ex
parte, approach to Judge Medley the morning of April 15, 2002, requesting a further
legal process in the form of a writ of assistance for the Search Order. Neither the state
court docket nor state court file reflect what Judge Medley was told by Matkin when he
sought that writ.
21.

Nevertheless, Matkin obtained the second legal process he sought on

lomed's behalf, and procured Judge Medley's signature on a writ of assistance,
captioned: "Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement" (hereinafter "Writ of
Assistance") and dated and entered by the Court on April 15, 2002. The Writ of
Assistance, no different than the Search Order, constituted a legal process that, under
both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of America, could not
be lawfully used to conduct a search and seizure.
22.

The Writ of Assistance expressly directed the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
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Office first, "to enter the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385
North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order [Allowing
immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence], including
entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining
any person who resists enforcement of the Order."
23.

As was the case with the Search Order, the Writ of Assistance was

obtained not at the request of any law enforcement agency or other governmental
agency, but instead solely at the request of a private party in civil litigation.
24.

The Writ of Assistance was not obtained for the benefit or in furtherance

of the desires of law enforcement pertaining to any criminal action or investigation or of
any governmental agency to investigate civil violations of any governmental regulatory
scheme or to pursue any civil forfeiture action of any governmental agency or otherwise
to further any interest of any governmental agency of any kind or nature, but solely and
strictly for the benefit of an individual citizen.
25.

Because there is no record currently available to plaintiff showing the

grounds presented to Judge Medley to obtain the Writ of Assistance, plaintiff infers the
same bases were proffered as for the Search Order, which do not incorporate any
prescribed statutory or administrative standards, that, themselves, are reasonable in
their careful balancing of governmental and private interests before an order may issue
thereunder authorizing a search of a person's home, by use of force, seizure of their
property, or arrest of the person of anyone interfering with the foregoing activities.
26.

Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance mandate a
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right to a prior hearing before any search, contain any standards for determining
reasonableness or even require, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, that a prior
request for materials be made and refused, before invading a private citizen's home or
arresting any citizen. Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance
provide any prior opportunity to be heard before a seizure or even any post-seizure right
to hearing.
27.

Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the Writ of Assistance, and Matkin,

Kopp and two other co-conspirators, all, in a deliberate show of force, came to the door
of Moss' Home while the illegal Writ of Assistance was served on Moss.
28.

Moss, under the illegal threat of having the door to her Home kicked in

and under the illegal threat of being "detained" if she interfered with the illegal search
and seizure, had no voluntary alternative and stepped aside as Matkin, Kopp and two of
the other co-conspirators illegally entered her Home and commenced the Illegal Search
and Seizure.
29,

Shortly thereafter, another Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Sergeant

Kendra L. Herlin, also arrived to reinforce the illegal threat to "detain" Moss if she
attempted to stop the Illegal Search and Seizure,
30,

Kopp, Matkin and the two other co-conspirators who illegally entered the

Home without lawful authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and
illegally seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties; all the while, Kopp
and the defendants knew that the legal process obtained could not be used lawfully to
threaten to kick in the door to the Home, threaten to "detain" anyone who interfered with
such illegal act, search the Home or seize property therein.
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31.

The property of Yanaki and Moss was then taken, without the consent of

either, to, on information and belief, the place of business of one of the co-conspirators.
32.

The object of the conspiracy was to misuse the legal processes obtained so

as to conduct an illegal search and seizure. That object was successfully carried out on
April 15, 2002, when the Police, Matkin and other co-conspirators used the legal process
to illegally entered into the Home, through the illegal threat of force and detention,
conducted an illegal search and illegally seized property.
33.

Each of the co-conspirators, including without limitation the defendants and

the police, agreed to commit, and did commit, one or more acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy, in order to allow the conspiracy to obtain its object successfully,
34.

On April 14,2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against defendants and

certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, seeking relief under the federal civil rights laws and under state law. That action
was dismissed, as to the federal claims, the district court finding that the actions of the
private defendants did not amount to "state action" as is required to sustain a federal civil
rights claim. However, the district judge expressly found, referring in part to the same
defendants who appear now before this Court: The invasion of Plaintiffs home,
supported only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit,
appears to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the
Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an
ex parte motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law enforcement
officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that Defendants' actions in this case
were committed under color of state law, this Court would find that Plaintiffs were
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deprived of a right secured by the 'Constitution and Laws' of the United States." Yanakl
v, lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261,1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004). The district court
suggested the possibility that defendants' conduct may give rise to an abuse of process
claim: "As noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the Defendants may have
been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or may not give rise to other
legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process, but the Defendants' actions
were undisputedly not initiated by the state, and therefore pursuant to the precedent
referred to in the body of this opinion may not serve as a basis for a claim under § 1983,"
Id. at 1265 n.8. The dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, Yanakiv. lomed, lnc.} 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), and that case is
now before the United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 05-940, on a petition for
certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's decision.
35.

Plaintiffs had entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants and

certain of the other co-conspirators on December 12, 2003.
36.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Jamal S. Yanaki was to be

paid the settlement sum, in exchange for a full release to the settling co-conspirators by
Moss and Yanaki.
37.

Defendants breached the settlement agreement by failing to timely pay or

cause to be paid the settlement sum to Yanaki.
COUNT I
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT)

38.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 37, above,

39.

Defendants have materially breached the settlement agreement.

40.

Such breach has been the cause of damages to Moss and Yanaki,
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including without limitation the foreseeable, consequential damages of being required to
incur attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in litigation that was to be resolved by the
settlement
41.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages for defendants' breach,

including consequential and special damages in the form of attorneys' fees, costs and
expenses, together with interest on all the damages that have accrued, both before and
after judgment.
COUNT II
(ABUSE OF PROCESS)

42.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 41, above.

43.

Ulterior motives existed that were served by the object of the conspiracy,

such that the process at issue in this case was sought for the purpose of using it
improperly to commit illegal acts.
44.

The Illegal Search and Seizure constitute acts, in the use of the legal

processes obtained, that are not proper in the regular prosecution of civil proceedings
and the misuse of the processes constitutes an actionable abuse of process.
45.

The abuse of process took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee &
Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior.
46.

The acts of the defendants if furtherance of the conspiracy constitute an

actionable abuse of process, and such abuse has been the cause-in-fact and legal cause
of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
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also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
47.

The abuse of process represents a wilful disregard for the rights of

plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co, v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT 111
(INVASION OF PRIVACY)

48.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 47, above.

49.

The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and

the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as YanakPs
confidential medical records, constitutes an actionable intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion.
50.

The intrusion described would be highly offensive to any reasonable

person.
51.

The intrusion took place in the respective course and scope of employment

of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat
superior.
52.

Further, the intrusion on seclusion was part and parcel of the pleaded

conspiracy, making all conspirators liable. The intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion has
been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss has been damaged in
the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be
proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together with additional
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damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of health care
expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries.
53.

The intrusion on seclusion represents a wilful disregard for the rights of

plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co, v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT IV
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

54.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 53, above.

55.

The invasion the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the

seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's confidential
medical records, was outrageous and intolerable in that It offended generally accepted
standards of decency and morality, including such standards as are expressly
enumerated in the Constitutions of the state of Utah and the United States of America.
56.

Defendants intended to cause or acted with reckless disregard of the

likelihood of causing emotional distress to plaintiffs.
57.

The defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct was the cause-in-fact

and legal cause of plaintiffs' severe emotional distress.
58.

The extreme and outrageous conduct of defendants took place in the

respective course and scope of employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr,
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior.
59.

Further, the extreme and outrageous conduct was part and parcel of the

pleaded conspiracy, making all conspirators liable,
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60.

The extreme and outrageous conduct has been the cause-in-fact and legal

cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
61.

The extreme and outrageous conduct represents a wilful disregard for the

rights of plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against
each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT V
(TRESPASS TO LAND AND CHATTELS)

62.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 61, above.

63.

Plaintiffs were, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the

Home and its contents,
64.

The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and

the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's
confidential medical records, was a trespass to land and chattels.
65.

The trespasses took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable
under respondeat superior,
66.

Further, the trespasses were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making all conspirators liable. The trespasses have been the cause-in-fact and legal

14

cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his
physical injuries.
67.

The trespasses each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs,

thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for
each trespass, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT VI
(CONVERSION)

68.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 67 above.

69.

Plaintiffs, at all times material hereto, were in lawful possession of the

chattels seized and removed from the Home.
70.

Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, converted plaintiffs' chattels with

an intent to deprive plaintiffs of their possession or use for a period of time.
71.

The conversions took place in the respective course and scope of

employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, BrownT Gee & Loveless, and it is liable
under respondeat superior.
72.

Further, the conversions were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy,

making ail conspirators liable. The conversions have been the cause-in-fact and legal
cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss and Yanaki have been damaged in such sums as may
be proven at trial for the reasonable value of their property, together with all reasonably
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foreseeable consequential damages,
73.

The conversions each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs,

thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for
each conversion, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
COUNT VII
(CIVIL CONSPIRACY)

74.

Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 73, above.

75.

Each of the defendants acted in concert, by way of a combination of two or

more persons, with the police and other co-conspirators.
76.

The conspiracy had one or more objects, as described above, in % 30, or as

otherwise may be uncovered in discovery in this action.
77.

There was a meeting of the minds between each combination of two or

more conspirators as to the object of the conspiracy and/or the courses of action by
which it would be carried forward.
78.

Each of the conspirators undertook one or more unlawful, overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy.
79.

The acts of one or more conspirators in furtherance of the object of the

conspiracy have been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages to plaintiffs. Moss
has been damaged in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater
sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together
with additional damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of
health care expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries
80.

The conduct of the conspiracy in pursuit of its object represents a wilful

disregard for the rights of plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages
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award against each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs each hereby demand trial by jury of all issues triable by a jury herein.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor, and against defendants,

jointly and severally, as follows:
A.

For all damages proved to the satisfaction of the court and jury. Such

damages including without limitation damages for the injury to specific rights invaded,
damages for the emotional distress caused, damages for the physical injury caused by
such emotional distress, pain and suffering and special damages in the form of health
care expenses, attorney fees, costs and expenses and all other reasonable foreseeable
consequential damages, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
B.

On Counts ll-VII, for punitive damages against each defendant, awarded in

conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
D.

For all of plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as

allowed at law, in equity, by statute, rule, inherent power of the Court or otherwise.
E.

For all such other and further relief of any kind or nature to which plaintiffs

may show entitlement by proof and as the Court deems just, proper and equitable in the
premises.

[THIS SPA CE LEFT BLANK
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INTENTIONALLY]

DATED

this

T

day of February, 2006.
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
'rofessional Corporation

\\BA^\D_D£VfbW. SCOFIELE
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs' Address:
385 North Wall Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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